Old Princeton Seminary was a land of giants – theological giants. And if you’re anything at all like me your appreciation for them is immense. Not all have felt that way, of course, and it may surprise you that in fact some have alleged that though they were giants of the Reformed faith their view of apologetics and of the human mind betrays it. Yeah, it surprised me too.
Hi, I’m Fred Zaspel, editor here at Books At a Glance, and I don’t buy that particular line, and neither does Paul Helseth. In fact, he wrote the book on the subject – “Right Reason” and the Princeton Mind: An Unorthodox Proposal. Today he’s here to talk to us about his very important book.
Paul, welcome, and thanks for talking to us today!
Paul Helseth:
Thanks for inviting me to be with you; I appreciate it a lot.
Zaspel:
Okay, explain for us what is so “unorthodox” about the proposal you make in the book.
Helseth:
Well, what I’m trying to do in the book is to challenge what seems to me to be the reigning Orthodox position on the old Princetonians. The standard assessment of the old Princetonians is that they weren’t nearly as consistently reformed as they thought they were. In fact, the standard storyline goes, there reformed bona fides as it were, were compromised by the Enlightenment. A commitment to a Scottish version of the Enlightenment called Scottish Common Sense Realism. That they embraced that school of thought, to one degree or another, and when they did so that really compromised a number of things including their epistemology, their theory of knowing, and their approach to apologetics. It turned them into, as one interpreter in the past has said, it turned them into rather bold rationalists. So my book is challenging that basic storyline and it’s trying to emphasize an interpretation of the old Princetonians that recognizes what, it seems to me, is very, very clear when you read just a few of their more important writings. Mainly that they did in fact have a place for subjectivity in their theory of knowing. In other words, they weren’t rather bold rationalists. They had an important place for the role of the Holy Spirit and they acknowledged the noetic effects of sin and the importance of being born again. So what I am trying to do in the book is to highlight some of those ideas in the writings of select old Princetonians and, in so doing, to challenge the standard interpretation which has been around for quite a while and seems to be going strong; but, based on your work and the work of others, that standard interpretation seems to be becoming less prevalent. Which I think is a good thing.
Zaspel:
The Princetonians are said to have been captive to the philosophy of Scottish Common Sense Realism. Just what is that? And in what way is this supposed to have held the Princetonians captive?
Helseth:
Not being a professional philosopher, my understanding of Scottish Common Sense Realism is associated with my attempt to understand the work of the old Princetonians. Again, according to the standard storyline, the old Princetonians, beginning with John Witherspoon when he came to America from Scotland to be the president of the College of New Jersey which eventually became Princeton University; when he came to America, he in a sense had a kind of conversion experience. In Scotland he was a staunch, Orthodox, confessionally centered theologian was very, very critical of moderate theologians and theology that was the consequence of embracing certain ideas that were percolating in Scotland in the Enlightenment. When he came to America, he went from being a critic of those ideas to embracing those ideas to one degree or another, and so the philosopher that he is thought to have accommodated is Francis Hutchison whose understanding of the moral sense, the idea that by examining human nature, we can discern what virtue requires independently of God’s revelation. Witherspoon is said to have embraced that idea, and that embracing of that idea is said to have, in a sense, had a revolutionary impact on his understanding of what Christian education requires. It elevated the power of the mind. It undermined the importance of God’s revelation of Himself both in His word, and in His world. And, in a sense, it encouraged an approach to Christian education that, rather than doing something like what Jonathan Edwards did, namely trying to view all of reality from a really God centered, biblically-based perspective, it eventually led Witherspoon and Witherspoon’s descendents to place revelation and reason, in many respects, on the same level; and to regard revelation and reason as relating to different domains of truth that need to be related to one another. If that’s true, that’s a pretty significant problem for people who claim to be reformed, as the old Princetonians did. One of the enduring questions, I think, in this whole discussion is what strain of the Scottish Enlightenment did someone like John Witherspoon embrace? Did he just embrace Hutchison and this more of an enlightened understanding of virtue? Or did he also embraced Thomas Reed, who is typically associated with Scottish Common Sense Realism? His ideas are really defined, the epistemological commitments, again as far as I can tell, of what is typically taken to be the Scottish position on knowing. Reed also had a very, very high estimate of the power of reason. And so the long and short of the matter is that Scottish Common Sense Realism is thought to be very problematic for people who claim to be reformed because it elevates the power of reason; it undermines the centrality and significance of God’s revelation; it compromises the noetic effects of sin; and it leads those who fall prey to all of those things to espouse the kind of evidentialist apologetic that places way, way too much confidence in the power of reason to argue people into embracing Christian truth.
Zaspel:
You have a much better grasp of the philosophical side of this question, but just as a historical observation, I’ve thought that it’s interesting that at the Centennial celebration at the seminary in 1912, Francis Patton made the remark, in one of his presentations, that the Common Sense philosophy was dominant at the college, he said, but it never had much influence at the seminary. I think it’s an interesting observation that he made, because he made that long before there was any controversy over this question. It was just a ‘by the way’ remark that he made. What do you know about that? Have you been able to trace specifically Common Sense thinking in the seminary?
Helseth:
Well, most of my exploration of the old Princetonians has been of the primary theologians at Princeton seminary in the 19th century. So Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge, B. B. Warfield, and then into the early 20th century with J. Gresham Machen. I have done some digging into the founding of Princeton seminary; so I have done some digging in Witherspoon and in Witherspoon’s son-in-law, Samuel Stanhope Smith, who became the president of Princeton College after Witherspoon. And my take on the matter is that Princeton seminary was founded in 1812 by Archibald Alexander, Samuel Miller, and Ashbel Green precisely so that there could be an alternative to the college. Ashbel Green and Miller and Alexander were either on the board or associated with the board of the college in the early 19th century. And they, with a number of more conservative board members, were becoming very frustrated with the direction that Samuel Stanhope Smith was taking the college. So they wanted to found an institution that was, to use Samuel Miller’s language, uncontaminated by the college. So my take on the matter is that Princeton seminary, at least at the time of its founding, was founded to be an alternative to the college which many at that time thought had gone off the rails in one way or another because of its openness to Enlightenment philosophy among other things. There’s more going on than that, but, as far as I can tell, this question is really essential to the identity of the seminary. The seminary, and again, as far as I can tell, was founded to be an alternative to an institution that was no longer producing ministers for the Presbyterian Church, at least as many ministers as were needed.
Zaspel:
Yes, that much is certain. The reasoning behind it with regard to the philosophy is an important observation.
Helseth:
So that’s my general take on it. Now what happened to Princeton after that in the 19th century and into the 20th century, to what extent did Scottish Common Sense Realism over time have a more pronounced impact on the seminary? I think that a good case could be made that it did began to have more of an impact, but the impact that it was having was really undermining the foundational purposes for the seminary itself.
Zaspel:
What’s the significance of the title: “Right Reason” and the Princeton Mind? “Right Reason” is in quotes – tell us what lies behind that.
Helseth:
The phrase, right reason is a phrase that is used explicitly by Warfield; and some variation of it is used by other Princetonians. It is significant in the discussion that I am trying to participate in because the phrase right reason is pointed to by critics of the old Princetonians and it’s cited as evidence that the old Princetonians in fact had accommodated Enlightenment philosophy in such a way that it was undermining their reformed commitments. I am not persuaded of that argument. I don’t think that when Warfield refers to right reason, or Archibald Alexander or Charles Hodge refers to knowing aright, or something like that, I don’t think they are referring to this natural ability of the fallen mind to see and interpret reality rightly or in a fully truthful and God centered fashion. I think that the Princetonians are using that phrase and the phrases associated with that phrase to refer to regenerated reason. So the only people who can truly reason rightly are those who have the mind of Christ. Reasoning rightly, seeing the world for what it is, understanding the teaching of Scripture, these are precisely the kinds of things that people without the Spirit, who are dead in sin, these are precisely the kinds of things that they cannot do. And they cannot do them, not because they are not smart, but because they simply don’t have the capacity to discern spiritual wisdom. So in my mind, the phrase right reason is pointing, not to Enlightenment philosophy, rather it’s pointing to the work of the Spirit. So if that’s the case, the Princetonians were very explicitly reformed in their epistemology.
Zaspel:
In broad perspective you answer this whole question in light of the Princetonians’ understanding of the “unitary operations of the soul.” Explain that for us.
Helseth:
Well, one of the things associated with this whole discussion of Scottish common sense realism, one of the central aspects of this discussion has to do with anthropology. How do we understand the soul? Is the so made up of distinct or discrete powers? Or is the soul a whole unit such that whatever the soul does, whether it’s thinking, feeling, or willing, whatever it does is an expression of the totality of the soul? A good example here is – think about somebody like Jonathan Edwards, who embraced what many have called a functionalist philosophical psychology. A functionalist understanding of the soul. So for someone like Edwards, willing is not what this faculty or power called the will does, and it does it independently of the mind and the emotion. No, willing is something that an agent does. A person does. A whole being does. So the decisions of the will, the actions of the will, are expressions of the totality of the whole person. And see, that’s what I think the Princetonians are doing with their understanding of right reason. Knowing is not something that the intellect alone does; rather, knowing is something that persons do, that agents do. When I am knowing, it is all of me that is knowing; it’s not just my mind, it’s not just my intellect: it’s all that I am. And the quality of my knowing, the competence of my knowing is really determined, then, not by the power of my intellect, not by my IQ, but rather it’s determined, at the end of the day, by the inclination of my heart; by the disposition of my soul. So I think this emphasis on the unitary operation of the soul is getting at a very, very Augustinian idea; namely, that our whole souls are inclined, in every sense, to what we love; and if God has inclined our soul to loving Him, then that inclination has a real bearing on everything that we do, including knowing. So that’s an idea that I think is essential to this concept of right reason.
Zaspel:
Warfield and VanTil. Given all this – that right reason is the reasoning of the Spirit-enlightened mind, and the unitary operations of the soul – was Warfield a presuppositionalist?
Helseth:
Good question. I think that, without claiming to be an expert on VanTil at all, I would say that VanTil misunderstood Warfield and the old Princetonians. And I would say VanTil misunderstood Warfield and the old Princetonians precisely because he believed that when Warfield referred to right reason, he was referring to, as VanTil puts it, he was referring to the natural man’s right reason. So VanTil was persuaded that Warfield thought that people in their natural condition, the unregenerate, retained the ability to reason rightly. VanTil argued that Warfield insisted that they had the ability to reason rightly because he was denying the noetic effects of sin. I think that he really misread Warfield at this point. But it’s interesting, I think the standard interpretation of the old Princetonians misreads Warfield and the other Princetonians at this point. I think, and I suspect that you agree, Fred, that if the old Princetonians when they refer to right reason or when they talk about knowing rightly, if they are referring to an ability that the so-called rational faculty or power of the soul has independently of the work of the Spirit, then that would be a significant problem. That would compromise the reformed commitments of the old Princetonians; but, if reasoning itself is not the activity of this isolated faculty or power known as the intellect, but rather it’s the whole person knowing, and the whole person knowing according to the underlying disposition or inclination of the heart, then that just places the whole discussion in an entirely different context. And it’s a context that, again, as far as I can tell, is thoroughly reformed.
Zaspel:
Explain for us what Warfield meant when he says that Christianity was placed in the world to “reason its way to dominion.” We might understand how such a phrase could be misunderstood, but read in the context of Warfield himself, what did this mean?
Helseth:
I think how we understand Warfield’s form of evidentialism is associated with this point. Warfield was clearly persuaded that it’s possible to make good arguments for the truthfulness of the Christian religion or the authority of Scripture. So it’s possible to present arguments for one thing or another that in and of themselves our objectively compelling. They do make a good case.
Zaspel:
Well, in fact, he insisted that even Bavinck and others argued the same when they said that the Christian’s arguing could silence and shut the mouths of the gainsayers, they are acknowledging the same.
Helseth:
And in other places – and I don’t recall exactly where this is off the top of my head, it might be in his essay on faith and its psychological aspects – but there is a phrase that he uses, I think in that essay, where he makes it clear. And this is his language, objective adequacy and subjective effect are not exactly correlated. So it’s possible to make an objectively adequate case for the truthfulness of some aspect of the Christian religion, but just because you can make an objectively adequate case doesn’t mean that it’s going to compel faith or ascent in the person who is listening to it or reading it or receiving it. Why is that? Well, because objective adequacy and subjective effect are not exactly correlated. I mean the person listening to the argument won’t get it if they don’t have the subjective capacity to get it. So, in my estimation, this phrase is getting at what the apostle Paul is getting at in places like I Corinthians 1 & 2. The natural man can’t understand the things of the spirit; they are foolishness to him. It’s not because they can’t understand propositions or follow the basic logical flow of the gospel or something like that. No, they don’t have the ability to appreciate the significance of it, they can’t discern the wisdom of it. See, I think that’s what Warfield is getting at. Another thing that I think is related to this is Warfield’s understanding of science. As you know, there’s a debate in the literature on Warfield and the old Princetonians that is critical of Warfield and the old Princetonians for their understanding of science. And typically those who are critical of the old Princetonians understanding of science set the old Princetonians in opposition to Kuyper and Bavinck and the Dutch reformed who, the critics argue, have a different understanding of science. So, are Christians and non-Christians doing the same kind of science? Are they building the same Temple of truth? Or, are they doing, because of their presuppositions, entirely different kinds of science? And are they building different temples of truth? Again, I think Warfield was arguing – listen, believers and unbelievers live in God’s world. When we do science we are all looking at and analyzing and assessing the same things. What distinguishes the Christian scientist from the unbelieving scientist is not the science itself. In other words Christians are not doing an entirely different kind of science. No, they are doing the same science but Christians are doing it better. They’re building the same Temple of truth, but Christians are building better than are those without the mind of Christ. And I think that is related to this phrase, “the Christian religion has been placed into the world to reason its way to dominion.” We are to engage God’s world. We are to take dominion. We are to reason Christian religion to dominion. And the way we do that is by engaging with truth. As Machen puts it, later in his essay Christianity and culture, when we are engaging the truth claims of culture, the truth claims of the world, we shouldn’t withdraw; we shouldn’t run away; we shouldn’t accommodate; we shouldn’t rollover and embrace the raining ideas. But rather we should consecrate modern learning to Christian truths. We should engage, to use Machen’s language, we should engage with all the enthusiasm of the various humanists. And I think that’s what Warfield is getting at. The Christian religion has been placed into the world to reason its way to dominion. We should engage science. We should engage in the life of the mind. We should engage in the various disciplines of the Academy. Not so we can do something that is entirely distinct from what unbelieving philosophers and scientists are doing; no, we should engage so that we can do science, do philosophy, better than others. And I think there is a kind of post-millennial hope, or optimism there, but it’s an optimism that is grounded, not in this enlightenment informed confidence in the power of the mind; no, it’s a confidence that is grounded in the knowing what the effects of the Spirit are on our capacity to know God’s world. I think that phrase, rather than being something that shows how tenuous the Princeton theology was, really points to one of its strengths and to one of the things that we really should emulate.
Zaspel:
Yeah, he had such a robust confidence in the Christian faith that we could take it to the Academy, take it to the world with confidence, that’s right. And that without any mistaken delusion that somehow evidence itself is going to make a man a Christian. He knew better than that.
Helseth:
Right, and I think that’s where the phrase objective adequacy and subjective effect are not exactly correlated.
Zaspel:
That’s right. That’s important. He has another passage in his essay on Augustine and knowledge and authority where he speaks of the evidence for the Christian faith and the reasoning of it. He says it is sufficient to persuade any normal mind, but then he picks up on it right away, but he says that does not say anything about the condition of the natural mind. He said, who’s to say that the natural mind is in its normal state? It’s not. It needs repair. And he speaks then of the regenerative work of the Spirit of God that’s necessary, and so on. He does have at all there.
Helseth:
I think he does.
Zaspel:
One more: you hold Warfield up as a role model of scholarly Christian interaction with culture. Give us a brief taste of that.
Helseth:
Well, I think this would just be expanding on what we were just addressing with Warfield’s emphasis on reasoning and engaging the world that we live in. I think something interesting that Warfield said in his essay, The Idea of Systematic Theology refers to what he calls progressive orthodoxy. He distinguishes progressive orthodoxy from what he calls retrogressive heterodoxy. So he acknowledges that it’s possible for orthodoxy to become even more orthodox. It’s possible for orthodox convictions to develop in such a way that they become stronger, more robust, more orthodox.
Zaspel:
Yes, and what he means by that is a progressive understanding of the Scriptures and God’s revelation.
Helseth:
Yes. And when one thinks about his emphasis on progressive orthodoxy. And, by the way, I’m also thinking at this point of other essays that he wrote, for example, his essay on Heresy and Concession where he makes it clear that when Christians engage the truth claims of culture, they should do so in such a way that they avoid finding themselves looking at the truth claims of God’s word from the perspective of the truth claims of the world. That, as Warfield says in that essay, is the fruitful mother of heresy. One of Warfield’s great phrases. He commends Christians engaging in the truth claims of culture, but doing so based on the conviction that we should move from the text to the truth claims of culture.
Zaspel:
Reasoning from the safe standpoint of the Scriptures or something like that is the phrase that he uses.
Helseth:
Right. Something like that. And so I think that is essential to his understanding of progressive orthodoxy. But there’s also a subtlety to it that, to be honest with you, I’m still wrestling with it and how it all works together because he does seem to suggest that the task of theology really does, in some way, have to do with all truth claims. And as you remember, in that essay, The Idea of Systematic Theology, he has an illustration in which he is associating the various theological disciplines within the larger theological encyclopedia and trying to show how they are related to one another. What’s interesting about that illustration is that all of the truth claims of all of the disciplines that you would find in a university or in the Academy are dealt with in one way or another by apologetics; by the theological disciplines. And this is where his emphasis on the circle of the sciences comes into play. He insists in this essay that theology is at the foundation of all academic endeavor and of all the sciences whether people realize it or not. And it’s also at the apex. So is at the foundation and it’s at the pinnacle. And so all the life of the mind, in the larger sense, is an essentially and an inherently theological enterprise, he argues. So that is essential to his understanding of progressive orthodoxy. So why should Christians engage in the Academy? Why should we strive, to use Paul’s language, to take every thought captive to the obedience of Christ? Well, I think Warfield would say, because we live in God’s world and, at the end of the day, all truth claims are inherently and essentially theological. So we should engage because God has given us the ability to engage and it is through that kind of engagement that our understanding of God’s revelation and our understanding of Christianity and orthodox doctrine will become progressively more and more orthodox. Now, again, there are some subtleties in there that I think if one gets them wrong, could lead the whole theological enterprise to run off the rails pretty quickly and to become a kind of theological liberalism. After all, liberals talk about progressive orthodoxy, too.
Zaspel:
But he carefully distinguishes from that.
Helseth:
Yes. So to kind of summarize that, I think Warfield is a role model of scholarly Christian interaction with culture because he not only is encouraging Christians to engage with the truth claims that they encounter in the place and time that they find themselves living in, but he is, himself, an example of somebody who engaged truth claims, but did so from a self-conscious commitment to the final authority of Scripture.
Zaspel:
And he very explicitly defines this idea of progressive orthodoxy in terms of a progressive and increasing understanding of God’s revelation. So he is still standing in the safe place of Scripture, as he calls it.
We’re talking to Dr. Paul Helseth, Professor of Christian Thought at the University of Northwestern in St.Paul, MN, and author of the very important book, “Right Reason” and the Princeton Mind: An Unorthodox Proposal. It’s one of those books that changes the discussion – a needed corrective – and if you’re interested in the thought of the giants of Old Princeton it’s a must have.
Paul, thanks for talking to us today.
Helseth:
Thank you so much for asking, Fred; it’s my pleasure. Thank you.
Buy the books
Right Reason And The Princeton Mind