A Book Review from Books At a Glance
by Brendan Bollinger
Introduction
In the winter of 1927 Johan Herman Bavinck (nephew and student of Herman Bavinck) gave a series of public lectures at the Delft University of Technology on the nature of worldview and its relation to both personality and truth. This was a topic of intense debate in the early 20th century Netherlands, where many among the rising generations felt that the concept of worldview was overly rationalistic, outdated, and unhelpful in the modern world, dominated as it was by the individual. These people believed it was more helpful to interpret worldviews as a sort of Trojan horse employed to disguise the agendas of those in power and useful only for analyzing the personality of those who held to the worldview. Bavinck took issue with this interpretation, and compellingly set out his apologetic for the concept of worldview. Despite (or perhaps because of) this counter-cultural message, the series proved immensely popular, and soon attracted a much larger audience than Bavinck had anticipated. To satiate public demand for a print version of the lectures, Bavinck compiled and refined his notes and had them published one year later as a book titled Personality and Worldview. Although originally published almost a century ago, Bavinck’s little book—available in English for the first time, thanks to the efforts of translator and editor, James Eglington—still has much to teach thoughtful Christians in the 21st century.
Table of Contents
- The Struggle for a Worldview
- The Essence of Personality
- The Problem of Unity
- Passive Knowing
- The Power of Reason
- The Reaction of the Conscience
- Mysticism and Revelation
- Personality and Worldview
Preliminary Thoughts
Although far from a mere duplication, J. H. Bavinck’s Personality and Worldview seems to build upon the foundation laid by his uncle, Herman Bavinck, and his own writings on worldview, such as the recently re-published gem, Christian Worldview. Most notably, J. H. Bavinck uses and improves his uncle’s conception of worldview as progressively developed over time by introducing the novel distinction between “worldvision” and “worldview.” A worldvision is “a set of intuitions about the world formed in all individuals by their family and home environment, their teachers and education, and the broad culture within which they live. It is also closely bound to the idiosyncrasies of an individual person’s temperament” (Bavinck 2022, 12). A worldview, on the other hand, builds upon and expands worldvision to provide an individual with a holistic view of the world which is not limited to the direct experience of said individual. By this definition, while everyone has a worldvision, very few have a worldview. The sort of worldvision/worldview any given individual finds attractive is informed and shaped by that individual’s personality.
Summary
Chapter 1
Early in the book, Bavinck shares his foundational belief that the entire history of human thought consists of an unending competition for precedence amongst the few truly distinct worldviews. In this competition, worldviews take turns dominating culture in a cyclical manner, with worldviews of days of yore often returning to reclaim precedence. However, in Bavinck’s day, this constant rotation of worldviews had led some to question the efficacy of the whole endeavor—if no one way of viewing the world was sufficiently compelling to last forever, does that mean the concept of worldview itself was pointless? Was the driving mission of worldview (i.e., approaching and discovering the truth) nothing but so much hot air? The answer many in Bavinck’s day gave to this question was a resounding “no.” Instead of fretting about worldview as a pursuit of truth, these individuals claimed that worldviews were only valuable insofar as they either revealed something of the personalities of those who held to them or defended the agenda of the elite. Bavinck’s answer to the question, however, was more nuanced. He argued that it was unhealthy and simplistic to argue either that worldview and personality were directly synonymous or utterly opposed. The truth lies somewhere in the middle: personality and worldview are “intertwined, interpenetrated, and together add up to one whole” (Bavinck, 30). Because of this, worldview may be rightly interpreted as both a revelation of personality and an approach to truth.
Having established this foundational principle, Bavinck goes on to argue for the importance of the concept of worldview, which he calls “a glorious thing” that “gives rest in existence” and “makes us see seemingly confusing and jagged occurrences in a particularly ordered whole. It gives us farsighted perspectives in life and the world.” (Bavinck 36). Worldview, however, must be intentionally fostered and developed from a “worldvision” (i.e., the set of intuitions and assumptions about the world inherited by every individual from their parents, teachers, culture, etc.). This worldvision, while sufficient for day-to-day life, cannot provide the objective, broad-minded perspective of a worldview, just as a compass may provide one with direction while not giving the bigger perspective of a map. A worldview, therefore, is superior to a worldvision and much harder to obtain since the development of a worldview necessarily entails the gradual destruction of elements of one’s worldvision. The prime example of this is of course the grandest of worldviews, the gospel of Christianity, which Bavinck describes as offering “a worldview that smashes a person’s worldvision into pieces on every side, that opposes the most intimate inclinations of the person from every side, that a human being cannot think up or invent because it was thought of by God and is given to us from God” (Bavinck 37). These four doctrines—the importance of worldview as an approach to truth, the close relationship between worldview and personality, the importance of developing a worldview from a worldvision, and the radical nature of the Christian worldview—are the foundation upon which Bavinck constructs the rest of his arguments.
Chapter 2
Bavinck now turns his attention to the subject of personality and its essence. He opens with a frank observation of the inherently mysterious nature of the soul which we cannot begin to comprehend. This depth of mystery in the soul must produce humility in those who would (like Bavinck himself) endeavor to understand it. Having established this caveat, he then proceeds to define the concept of personality.”
Personality, says Bavinck, is “an organized soul that has come to consciousness of itself” (Bavinck 42). The soul, in turn, he defines as “independent, created by God, with its distinctive functions found in its entire nature and essence, with strivings, capacities that we see coming to the fore in the conscious life, and with which we become acquainted from that conscious life” (Bavinck 42). Bavinck further describes the soul as having five distinct, yet closely interconnected, functions: reception (of information), conservation (of information in the memory), connection (of the information received through the senses), appreciation (of the impressions of the senses and the memories possessed by the soul), and longing. The study of personality consists in studying the balance of these five functions in the soul. A mature soul is one in which all five functions are balanced and well-proportioned: in short, it has obtained a radical unity of its functions. An immature soul has one or more of the functions that dominate the others. The remainder of the chapter consists of Bavinck working through numerous case studies of individuals in whom one of the psychical functions has come to dominate the others. He concludes with a reminder that, while this schema is helpful, it nevertheless falls far short of the mysterious truth of the soul.
Chapter 3
Bavinck now poses the question, “To what extent can the phenomena in the world be reduced to a comprehensive unity?” (Bavinck 59). This is, of course, a key question for both worldview (which seeks to view the world as a unified whole) and personality (since the development of personality involves the forces of the soul being united). Most worldviews throughout history have failed to connect the phenomena of the world into a unity, instead opting for some variant of dualism. In his analysis of animism (a type of religion Bavinck was very familiar with, having worked for years in the East Indies as a missionary), Zoroastrianism, Indian philosophy (mainly Buddhist), and Platonism, Bavinck concludes that each of these worldviews, in their own ways, incorporate some sort of dualism in the way they see the world, whether dualism between good and bad (ethically or practically) or dualism between spirit and flesh. Only Christianity, Bavinck argues, succeeds in viewing the phenomena of the world in a radical unity while still taking into account the often jarring conflict among these phenomena. It does this by simultaneously acknowledging the existence of the dichotomy between good and evil and providing hope that the individual can eventually escape the conflict of the two. In Bavinck’s own words, “this worldview [Christianity] pulls the human being upward. It does not deny (that) the dichotomy (is there), but it does deny the dichotomy’s right (to be there).” (Bavinck 78).
Chapter 4
Chapters 4-7 deal with particular worldviews which were current in Bavinck’s time. Chapter 4 is concerned with the Renaissance and the rise of Empiricism. While Bavinck is more than fair in his summary of the history and theory of empiricism, his critiques of it are nevertheless incisive. He correctly notes that the central creed of empiricism is the law of causality and that the practice of empiricism demands that we become passive in our knowledge (i.e., we must absorb information by receiving information through our senses). This results in a mechanized view of the universe (and of the human soul) which Bavinck finds troubling, as such a worldview leaves no room for mystery, spontaneity, or freedom. He goes on to cite both Lock and Hume as proof of the untenability of empiricism. From Locke, he deduces that it is only possible for humans to perceive attributes, not substances. From Hume, he argues that the law of causality itself is the fruit of human thought. Thus, the central pillars of empiricism (the law of causality and the reliability of our senses) come crashing down. The conclusion of this chapter is that empiricism, while useful and beneficial in its own sphere, is sadly deficient as a worldview.
Chapter 5
In addition to empiricism, the Renaissance and later the Enlightenment also gave rise to another worldview called rationalism, which sought to understand the world and answer the big questions of epistemology mathematically. The founder of this worldview was Rene Descartes, whose famous dictum, “cogito ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am) grounded epistemology in the activity of the human mind. This was later refined by Baruch Spinoza who, instead of emphasizing the “I” of the Cartesian mantra, emphasized the existence of God as the foundation of epistemology. Bavinck, naturally, had some strong critiques of rationalism, of which the most notable are as follows: 1) particularly in the thought of Spinoza, rationalism constantly takes up ideas that cannot be drawn from logical deduction but rather only from experience; 2) it takes the leap from thinking to being too easily; 3) mystery has no place in this system; 4) this system does no justice to personality. Rationalism is essentially unbalanced and leaves unfulfilled many of the deepest longings of the human heart. Such a worldview can hardly be satisfactory, and all too often leads to skepticism and uncertainty.
Chapter 6
Bavinck here explores a worldview (or category of worldviews) which constitutes a reaction against the excesses of empiricism and rationalism: namely, the system of thought which has come to be known as romanticism. This system, like a caged tiger, grew weary of the close confines of polite, post-Enlightenment, rational, and empirical culture of the eighteenth century and consequently broke out of its cage with ferocious vigor. The desire and mantra of this movement was “Life!” Life untrammeled and unlimited by any pretense or artificiality. The entire movement was marked, therefore, by a certain revolutionary flavor—but instead of revolution against political structure or power, it was rebellion against culture itself and the chains it forces unwitting men to wear. Epitomized by men such as Goethe, Lord Byron, Wordsworth, and Longfellow, Romanticism was an undoubtedly energetic movement (although the direction of this energy is often unclear).
In this chapter, Bavinck also addresses Immanuel Kant, the enormously significant Prussian philosopher who, in many ways, opposed Romanticism and yet still, in some important ways, echoed the sentiments of this movement. Like the Romantics, Kant was not entirely satisfied with the fruit of empiricism and rationalism. However, instead of throwing these systems out entirely, Kant sought to unite them in such a way that would still leave room for the mysterious and the numinous. At the risk of oversimplifying Kant’s theory, the most basic explanation of his solution was to acknowledge the merits both of empiricism and rationalism as approaches to truth, but to couple this with a frank admission of the limited nature of human perception. This has the admirable outcome of preserving mystery (and personality) while also maintaining the power of human reason. However, the undesirable outcome of this is that it banishes God and the supernatural to the realm of unknowability and therefore reduces belief in God into a sort of ethical fideism. As with empiricism and rationalism, Bavinck takes issue with Kant’s philosophy on four points: 1) the postulates of freedom, immortality, and God are mere postulates, and therefore uncertain; 2) if the foundation of this worldview is the will, it cannot approach true objectivity; 3) Kant lay far too strong an emphasis on human freedom (which, as mentioned above, is but a postulate in his thinking); 4) Kant’s concept of God is a dead and empty thing.
Chapter 7
Bavinck here treats with mysticism, which differs from the previous worldviews explored in this book in that it is a universal impulse, not just a theory espoused by particular people at a particular time. It is, in fact, not a worldview at all, but only emerges in conjunction with other worldviews. Because of the scope and variety of mystical tendencies, Bavinck opts to analyze a more general, pantheistic form of mysticism which is “more or less isolated from the great religions” (147).
This pantheistic mysticism (as with all other forms of mysticism) begins with the assumption that God is near accessible to us, and it is driven by the desire for union with God. This pursuit usually takes the form of various forms of contemplation and meditation, through which the mystic seeks a sort of ecstatic union with and experience of God. The nature of this experience, when it occurs, is such that it cannot be properly explained in human language, and its practitioners often resort to purely apophatic description of the divine. This naturally gives rise to an attitude toward the world which understands the goal of life to a renunciation of the self in order to experience more of God.
While there is much to admire in this form of mysticism, Bavinck identifies a few key issues. First, the God of mysticism is purely passive and stationary—he (or it) does not seek us, we must make all the effort to seek him. Second, because the morality of mysticism consists of withdrawing from life, it cannot give any sort of governing principle for engaging in life. This is true, however, only in the unhealthier forms of mysticism. When mysticism is coupled with orthodox Christianity, it takes on a new richness and avoids many of the errors of its more pantheistic relatives. Because Christianity is driven by faith (which stands above experience) it is able to keep the experience of mysticism within proper bounds.
Bavinck concludes the chapter with a beautiful reflection on the splendor of the Christian worldview over and against its competitors. Unlike empiricism and rationalism, Christianity recognizes the limits of human knowledge. On our own, we cannot plumb the depths of the mysteries that surround us. Likewise, Christianity has a balanced worldview which none other can replicate. Instead of viewing God as pantheistically imminent or deistically transcendent, it understands him to be both imminent and transcendent. Instead of viewing life as deterministic or indeterministic, it views life as a mysterious mixture of both. And unlike the cold and distant God of pantheistic mysticism, Christianity believes in a God who sought us through his very son, the mediator of Christian mysticism.
Chapter 8
In this final chapter, Bavinck concludes his study and summarizes his main points. He opens this conclusion by making a few important caveats plain. First, he did not intend in this volume to give an exhaustive list of every possible worldview—such would be impossible and insupportable. Second, it must be recognized that all the worldviews he has reviewed are only ever fully understood by relatively few minds and trickle down into broader culture slowly and imperfectly. He then proceeds to conclude his study.
Of the various worldviews studied in this book, Bavinck identifies only two which have the capacity to become commonplace among the masses in Western culture: atheistic materialism and Christianity. The first is untrue in that it approaches God without acknowledging his existence. In fact, this is true of all the systems of thought which Bavinck has studied: empiricism, rationalism, Kantian philosophy, and pantheistic mysticism all approach God but then swerve away at the last moment to deny him. This leaves only Christianity as the worldview which most accurately captures the nature of reality—for it is the only worldview to properly understand God. This leads Bavinck to warn that “the emergency facing our Western world is its loss of Christianity—the lack of true religion, of self-denial, of sacrifice, of faith, of trust, of a sense of shame, of hope in God” (177). Truly, the study of worldview is of great importance!
Assessment and Recommendation
Bavinck’s little book is unique among the various Christian studies of worldview in that it seeks to take into account not merely philosophical considerations, but also psychological. His profound study of worldview and personality is balanced, thorough, and eminently enjoyable to read. While at times quite technical, his flowing prose and clear explanations ensure that anyone can pick up and benefit from Bavinck’s thought. This work is, of course, a bit dated in certain respects, such as the author’s rather unfortunate treatment of Medieval philosophy, but the thrust of Bavinck’s argument remains as applicable today as it was nearly a hundred years ago. It is my pleasure to commend Personality and Worldview to anyone who wishes to gain an understanding of worldview—particularly its psychological components. It will surely benefit any pastors, teachers, or laypersons interested in the subject!
Brendan Bollinger