A Book Review from Books At a Glance
By Fred G. Zaspel
It’s not every day that we see a major new book on the doctrine of sin, and as soon as I saw this book coming I was eager to get a copy. It didn’t hurt either that it is part of John Feinberg’s excellent series, Foundations of Evangelical Theology. This was my first reading-acquaintance with Thomas McCall, and from the get-go I found him engaging. In chapter 1 (“Introduction”) he spreads the table highlighting the “obvious” nature of this doctrine – evident as it is in all human experience – yet stressing the necessity of special revelation in order for us to understand sin as sin. As McCall in these dozen pages vividly sketches out his area of study and establishes his starting point and frame of reference, he draws in the reader’s interest with a sense that we are in for an informed study.
In chapter 2 (“Sin According to Scripture: A First Look”) McCall helpfully surveys, 1) the primary biblical vocabulary for sin, and 2) the developing portrayal and characterization of sin from Genesis to Revelation (“Biblical Theological Overview”). This survey provides an illuminating beginning to the study, culminating in summary observations: royal-legal metaphors, familial metaphors, the nuptial metaphor, and sin as idolatry. At this point in McCall’s study we have Scripture’s doctrine of sin in broad compass; the following chapters narrow the focus to examine specific areas of study: the origin of sin (chapter 3), the doctrine of original sin (chapter 4), the “sin nature” and the nature of sin (chapter 5), the results of sin (chapter 6), and sin and grace (chapter 7).
We are not far into the book at all before noticing McCall’s broad acquaintance with the related literature. He cites from lesser- and better-known OT Theologies and NT Theologies, a wide spectrum of Historical Theology, diverse historical figures such as Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas, Zwingli, Arminius, Wesley, Edwards, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Bavinck, more recent writers as diverse as Barth, Berkouwer, Reinhold Niebuhr, T.F. Torrence, N.T.Wright, D.A. Carson, Bruce Waltke, Richard Dawkins, Stanley Grenz, Cornelius Plantinga – various OT and NT scholars, Calvinists, Arminians, Liberals, and Catholics. There is however relatively slight reference to the standard Systematic Theologies. Still, it seems that scarcely a paragraph passes that is not supported by helpful citations, and the reader is left with the impression that McCall has read widely on his subject. And indeed, when it comes to points of specific theological debate, he is able to articulate the various positions with helpful clarity.
McCall’s obvious strength is philosophical theology. He is well acquainted with the related philosophical schools and backgrounds pertinent to various discussions, he grasps clearly the conceptual framework of the alternative positions, and he has thought through the logical strengths, weaknesses, and entailments of each. So also with Historical Theology. McCall is clearly at home when he is “theologizing.”
McCall’s Arminian commitments show up frequently in some guiding assumptions and of course especially in those areas of doctrine touching “determinism.” He seems particularly concerned, for example, to distance God from the origin of sin. This is a concern shared by Christian interpreters of virtually all stripes, although precise definitions vary in important ways. He takes up the question with vigor in chapter 3 (the origin of sin) and again in chapter 5 and yet again in chapter 7. It’s a difficult question: on the one hand we must acknowledge God as sovereign creator of all that is, and on the other hand we must affirm human responsibility and culpability for sin. McCall finally leaves the question to mystery but only after ruling out a Reformed compatibilist view. He acknowledges God as creator in this context and even that God is sovereign, ruling over all that is, but this affirmation is generally described in an “after the fact” kind of way – God turning sin to accomplish his own ends. He further argues that if God is good, then evil cannot in any sense be traced back to him – any doctrine that has even an “entailment” that traces sin back to God the creator is disallowed. The rub here, of course, is how to acknowledge God as sovereign creator in a way that avoids such an entailment in any sense. And so, for McCall, it is “mystery.” Of course, on one level all sides agree: God can never be blamed for human sin (James 1:13). But McCall is unwilling to entertain the compatibilism that seems to be demanded, for example, in passages such as Genesis 50:20 (cf. Psa. 105:17), Isaiah 10:5-19, Acts 2:23 / 4:27-28, etc. McCall gives no attention at all to Isaiah 10 in this regard; this is disappointing, given that the passage specifically affirms that God “commands” and sends wicked Assyria as his tool against Israel and yet just as clearly assigns the guilt to the Assyrians because of their own evil intentions.
McCall does address Genesis 50:20, and here I cite him in full:
Moreover, Scripture portrays God as actively working in human history to use actions of human wickedness to achieve his own good purposes. Consider the famous scene that unfolds late in the life of Joseph. At the culmination of the story, Joseph reveals his identity to the brothers who had mistreated him and sold him into slavery to the Egyptians. Although they are afraid of this abused brother who is now a powerful Egyptian official, he asks them to “come close” (Gen. 45:4 NIV). He then displays a remarkable conviction about God’s presence and action through this time: “it was to save lives that God sent me ahead of you” (v. 5 NIV). After their father dies, the brothers are once again afraid of Joseph. In a stunning reversal of fortunes, they throw themselves down before him and offer to be his slaves. Again, his response is telling: “you intended to harm me, but God intended it for good to accomplish what is now being done, the saving of many lives” (50:20 NIV). There is no sense in which the Genesis account presents the shameful treatment of Joseph by his brothers as anything other than wrong—even outrageously wrong. And yet the narrative also points to God’s providential actions in and through this set of events. What the brothers did was wrong, and we can only judge it as sin. But God was not absent; neither was God inactive or merely reactive. To the contrary, Joseph is convinced that God intended to use his brothers’ sinful actions for the greater good of God’s own beneficent purposes. And, clearly, God is successful in doing so: they committed these evil deeds with shameful intentions, but God worked to turn their evil actions for a greater good (343-344).
Here McCall seems to acknowledge God as sovereign, but note that although he is willing to speak of God’s intention with regard to the sin of Joseph’s brothers, this intention, he says, is specifically “to use” those sinful actions for his own good purposes. This language seems designed to avoid compatibilism. This is an “after the fact” kind of sovereignty that does not allow the full force of “God intended it” (Gen. 50:20). Nor does McCall make reference to the direct affirmation of Psalm 105:17 that it was in fact God himself who “sent Joseph ahead of them” into Egypt. Both of these (Gen. 50:20 and Psa. 105:17) have “before the fact” connotations that McCall does not allow. He is surely right to affirm that the actions of Joseph’s brothers were nothing other than sinful, but he is unwilling to affirm that God stands behind it in some sense – for example, that he stands directly and immediately behind good and behind evil only indirectly such that the guilt of the action lies only with the sinner himself who acts willingly (again, see Isa. 10). More satisfying on this, in my judgment, are D.A. Carson’s Praying with Paul: A Call to Spiritual Reformation, chapter 9, and How Long, O Lord? Reflections on Suffering and Evil, chapters 11-13. See also Bruce Ware, “The Compatibility of Determinism and Human Freedom” in Nettles and Barrett, Whomever He Wills: A Surprising Display of Sovereign Mercy, and John Piper, Spectacular Sins.
Acts 2:23 and 4:27-28 are important for this discussion, affirming explicitly that the crucifixion of Christ was a sinful action that was ordained of God, and in his brief treatment of Acts 4:27-28 McCall again comes close to something like the compatibilism he cannot bring himself to affirm:
God is sovereign in the sense that he is supremely authoritative and will judge human sinners for their sins, and God is sovereign in the sense that not even the death of Christ is outside of God’s providential and redemptive purposes (344).
We agree. But if with McCall we deny that the sinful act of Jesus’ crucifixion was “outside of God’s providential and redemptive purposes,” is this not to affirm that God stands behind the sinful act in some sense? Is not this a doctrinal “entailment” that McCall says he cannot allow?
With all the church McCall whole-heartedly affirms the doctrine of original sin (chapter 4), but of course the devil is in the details – just how to define this doctrine is the question. Does original sin consist in both corruption and guilt, or corruption only? And just how does this become ours? Is it inherited? Imputed? Mediately? Immediately? And so on. And again the question is a tough one, as evidenced by the differences even among Reformed interpreters (e.g., Calvin, Edwards, Shedd, Hodge, etc.). And as McCall points out the precise connotation of eph ho in Rom 5:12 is debated. McCall is not impressed with federalism, and he argues that although Romans 5:12ff allows such a view it does not demand it. His leading objection to imputed guilt (“alien guilt,” as he once refers to it) is the question of justice – that it seems inconsistent with moral responsibility. Yet he raises no such objection to the idea of imputed or inherited corruption, which on any view would seem to raise the question of justice also. Disappointingly, there is no interaction of any kind with the likes of John Murray (see here and here), nor does he offer any extended reflection on the Romans 5:12ff parallel with imputed righteousness or the problem of the death (sin’s penalty) of infants who have not yet sinned. In any case, although McCall sorts out the options well, he is again unable finally to decide the question and leaves it to mystery.
In chapter 5 (“The ‘Sin Nature’ and the Nature of Sin”) McCall first takes up the study of human nature in relation to sin. The influence of early twentieth century Keswick and “higher life” types in evangelical Christianity has been pervasive, one feature of which is the popular language of “the believer’s two natures,” and to this McCall offers a needed corrective. The two-nature theory was a handy way to explain the believer’s struggle with sin, but with even a moment’s reflection the concept becomes confusing, to say the least. McCall does not spend much time treating the question on an exegetical level or clarifying the alternative view that in Christ human nature is renewed, but once again he shows his analytical skills as he subjects the two-nature teaching to devastating logical analysis. McCall’s treatment in this chapter of the nature of sin itself is helpful in framing various conceptual categories, often explaining with important and fascinating perspectives from the church’s past. Surprisingly, there is no discussion of sin as guilt here. McCall discusses guilt in the next chapter, but there almost exclusively in subjective terms (felt guilt, “guilt and shame”) rather than objective (judicial guilt, a high crime incurring and deserving of divine retribution).
In chapter 6 McCall addresses the results or consequences of sin and again articulates the concepts clearly. He treats, in order, enslavement and debility, depravity, guilt and shame, sin and death, and the judgment and wrath of God. He does not address the Pauline notion of “the flesh” or the broad theme of the reign of sin, as such. But as a “good” Arminian (I mean that in the best sense) he frankly acknowledges depravity. He can say that by our sins we become enslaved to sin, and at first the reader may suspect that this true but inadequate statement will be as far as McCall is willing to go. But he does acknowledge (with Wesley and the Reformed) the “total corruption” of humanity. However, 1) he differs with Calvin and the Reformed on the meaning of human freedom (rejecting compatibilism), and 2) he seems to mitigate the idea of universal total depravity with a doctrine of (resistible) prevenient grace. In fact, McCall has a curious take on Augustine in this regard. His overview of the Augustine-Pelagius controversy is insightful and overall quite helpful, but he makes the astonishing claim that Augustine did not believe that grace is irresistible. For evidence he cites Augustine himself: “When the ability is given, no necessity is imposed” (On the Spirit and the Letter, 54). Well, there it is! Or so we are left to think. But taken in context the quote just will not overthrow the common understanding of Augustine. In this paragraph Augustine affirms the necessity of grace for faith and further distinguishes between the volition to believe and the volition to sin. God gives volition to believe, but he need not give a volition to sin to anyone – fallen humanity already has such a volition. Unless I am mistaken, in the quote that McCall cites Augustine is saying that God gives the sinner not the volition to sin but (as an act of judgment) the ability to carry out that sinful desire. It is in reference to this “ability” that Augustine says “no necessity is imposed.” It seems to me that McCall’s attempt to reign in Augustine fails, not taking the statement in context.
In his examination of death as a consequence of sin (still in chapter 6) McCall focuses primarily on the related question of death before the fall, and once again he patiently and helpfully sorts out the options and their respective entailments. I was disappointed, however, that he seems to allow the possibility of some kind of evolutionary ancestry to Adam and Eve, the first humans. He does not affirm this position, but neither does he deny it.
In chapter 7 McCall addresses the relation of providence and sin, as I noted above. He also explores more specifically the relation of grace and depravity. He sketches out a broad, common affirmation of prevenient grace among theologians across the centuries, but his emphasis on this commonality leaves an impression of wider agreement than actually exists. All Christians this side of Augustine agree that grace must “go before,” but the opposing understandings of grace as resistible or irresistible is no minor disagreement. There is prevenient grace according to Augustine, and there is prevenient grace according to Wesley, but the commonality ends with the terminology.
By way of evaluation, recommendation, and “what I would have preferred” … I confess that I began reading the book with higher anticipations than in the end I felt were realized. McCall’s Arminian commitments in my judgment weaken the book at important points. And I could wish that he were more exegetically oriented. He does not ignore Scripture, but his approach is not exegetically driven – exegesis of key passages and themes does not dominate. Perhaps this explains his failure to come to final decision at some critical points. Again, McCall’s strength is theologizing. His grasp of each next view and perspective is firm, and he is able to convey the critical essence of each view clearly, along with illuminating philosophical or conceptual background or context. In this respect the book is helpful. His distinguishing of various positions and related concepts is precise, and he conveys his thoughts clearly and engagingly.
Fred G. Zaspel
Executive Editor, Books At a Glance
Pastor, Reformed Baptist Church, Franconia, PA
Adjunct Professor of Theology, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary